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which he has recommended, but rather only that the adviser must disclose
his trading on his own account that is in any sense inconsistent with, the
recommendation he has given his clients."
An adviser will be unable to circumvent the holding of the principal
case by having his wife or other member of his immediate family trade in
the stocks recommended, if such trading is not consistent with the advice
offered. In the case of In Re Midland United Co.,81 where the wife of an
attorney, who had confidential information concerning securities, was trad-
ing in these stocks, the court said it was justified in
extending the principles applicable to the conduct of the fiduciary
to the fiduciary's wife. The settled rule in equity is that where a
fiduciary is barred from compensation the prohibition extends to
his wife.32
However, if the fiduciary, in our case an investment adviser, has no knowl-
edge of his wife's dealings in the securities, there is authority that such
transactions will not constitute fraud." The Torr case stated that disclosure
to the client is required if the adviser is being paid by an issuer or other
interested party to favorably report a stock. An eventual result of Torr and
Capital Gains would be to require an adviser to disclose any substantial in-
terest he might have in a corporation whose stock the adviser recommends.
The Court, in this first contested case concerning fraud under the In-
vestment Advisers Act, while not prohibiting all trading on personal ac-
counts in recommended stock, has required disclosure where there is any
possibility of a conflict, and in so doing has followed the course which other
courts have taken in similar cases under the related securities acts. The re-
sult reached in this case is desirable in light of the possible opportunities for
abuse by investment advisers and the lack of flexible means and remedies to
protect the buying public.
DWIGHT W. MILLER
Trade Regulation—Robinson-Patman Act—Substantial Lessening of
Competition Not Proven by Short-Term Discounts.—American Oil Co.
v. FTC.'—This was a petition from an FTC cease and desist order wherein
the petitioner was charged with price discriminations in violation of Section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 2
 American Oil Co. employed as part
a° Supra note 1, at 196.
31 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947).
32 Id. at 347.
33 In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
1 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963).
2 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958). Section 2(a) of the act, as
amended, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, .. . where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
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of its marketing techniques a Competitive Price Allowance (CPA) which
enabled it to grant discounts in the wholesale price to individual dealers
whenever necessary? The complaint focused upon a local (Georgia) price
war during which American granted a lower "CPA" to its Smyrna-area
dealers than it did to its Marietta-area dealers, both groups later found
to be in competition with each other. This price discrimination, ranging
from 3.5 cents to 11.5 cents per gallon in favor of Smyrna dealers over
Marietta dealers, lasted for a seventeen day period. On October 28, 1958,
the price war ended and American's "CPA" in the area again became uniform.
Following a hearing on a complaint, the FTC found American's price dis-
criminations constituted a violation of section 2(a) and the Commission
issued a cease and desist order against American. On petition to the U.S.
Court of Appeals, the 7th Circuit HELD• Order Set Aside. The record
in the case did not contain substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion
that American's temporary price reductions, although discriminatory, pre-
cipitated any reasonable probability of substantial injury to competition.
In reaching their conclusion, the court stated that they did not mean to
imply that a showing of intended permanency of price discrimination is
necessary to establish a section 2(a) violation; but that there must be
something more than an essentially temporary impact on certain competitors.
Probative analysis must reveal a causal relation between the price discri-
mination and an actual or reasonably probable injury to competition in the
context of the factual situation involved.
It appears well established that the courts construe section 2(a) in a
literal sense as being aimed at price discrimination which may have an
adverse effect on competition, and not that which may have an adverse
effect on an individual competitor? The controversy as to whether section
2(a) is concerned with injury to competition or injury to competitors sprang
from the broad dicta of Mr. Justice Black in the landmark Morton Salt
decision where the scope of the statute was expanded to include the possibility
of harms However, the FTC has disclaimed the Morton Salt dicta, and it
has, as in the instant case, adhered to the position that the statutory test
is injury to competition,° at least so far as "secondary line" competition
is concerned./ This interpretation of section 2(a) by the FTC has drawn
substantial support from a long line of recent decisions which indicate that
the courts as well have steered clear of the dicta in Morton Salt, and interpret
the act as aimed at the preservation of competition and its concern with the
tion with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .
As the "CPA" increased, the price paid for the gasoline by the dealers propor-
tionately decreased, and consequently as the dealers maintained a gross margin of profit
of five cents per gallon their resale price was directly measured by the amount of the
"CPA" extended.
4 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d
835 (7th Cir. 1961).
5 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49 (1948).
6 Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 112 (1954).
7 Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1959).
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individual is but incidenta1.8
 These conclusions are summarized by the
Seventh Circuit in the landmark Anheuser-Busch decision in 1961:
The Act is really referring to the effect upon competition and not
merely upon competitors .... In this respect § 2(a) must be read
in conformity with the public policy of preserving competition,
but it is not concerned with mere shifts of business between com-
petitors. It is concerned with substantial impairment of the vigor
or health of the contest for business, regardless of which competitor
wins or loses. The competition which is sought to be protected by
this section is a contest between sellers for the buyer's contest for
trade'
The courts have felt that directing the purpose of the Act toward the
protection of competition is fundamental to a reconciliation of the Robinson-
Patman Act with over-all antitrust policies." However, while this distinc-
tion must be kept in mind, it should not be forgotten that although the
literal purpose of the Act was to prohibit price discriminations which may
be injurious to competitive enterprise, the unique feature of the Act was
its design to afford protection to individual competitors in "secondary line"
competition against such price differentials in order to preserve competition
generally, and to protect small business in particular." "Secondary line"
is the term given to the competition between the seller's buyers and their
customers as opposed to "primary line" competition between the seller and
other sellers. While the statutory test reprehends adverse effects on compe-
tition, a seller's discriminatory pricing may by its nature simultaneously
injure a competitor and competition." It is with this basic Robinson-Patman
philosophy in mind that the holding of the instant case must be evaluated.
By the prevailing view price discrimination per se does not constitute
a violation of section 2(a)' 8 and hence proof of that without more is in-
sufficient." The Commission has always construed the Act as placing the
8 FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond
Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959); Standard Motor Prod., Inc.
v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959); E. Edelman & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152
(7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958).'
9 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 4, at 840.
le Automatic Canteen Corp. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1954); Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951); Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957). See also, Rowe, Price Discrimination Under
The Robinson-Patman Act, 130 (1962).
11 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc,, 363 U.S. 536, 544 (1960); H.R. Rep. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); Austin,
Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 8-11 (1959).
12 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954); E. B. Muller
& Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
13 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
FTC, supra note 4.
14 A prima facie case of violation of section 2(a) requires proof of the following
matters:
The first part of Section 2(a) sets out the elements necessary to establish a
violation of the law. They are: (1) discrimination in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality; (2) certain jurisdictional
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onus upon it ("plaintiff") for proving that the effect of a price discrimination
will be to substantially lessen or injure competition." This interpretation
has also been followed by the courts," notwithstanding the aberational
view set down by the 2nd Circuit in the controversial Moss decision.ri
The pivotal portion of section 2(a) in the instant case is "substantially
to lessen competition," and it was on this ground that the FTC according
to the 7th Circuit failed to sustain its burden of proof. It is generally con-
ceded that the Act requires substantial and not trivial or sporadic interference
with competition to establish a violation of section 2(a). 18 As to what consti-
tutes a substantial lessening of competition will naturally depend on the
particular facts of each case." However, various guideposts have been erected
by the courts in ascertaining this often times elusive standard. The tradi-
tional position was laid down by the Supreme Court in 1922 when they
held that the Act was aimed at price discriminations which would probably
lessen competition." However, the area appeared to cloud when the Court
in Morton Salt held that evidence sufficient to support a finding of reason-
able possibility of injury to competition is enough to satisfy the Act. 21
The substitution of this test for the formerly accepted reasonable proba-
bility test was severely criticized by the dissent to that decision. 22 Notwith-
standing Morton Salt, the FTC has not relied on the possibility test as a
doctrinal proposition. 23 Although there may be an occasional loose reference
to possibility rather than probability, the terms are used interchangeably,
but have not been applied by the courts in a doctrinal sense either. 24 One
thing is quite clear however, in a proceeding under section 2 (a), proof
of actual injury to competition is neither necessary nor required, for it is
sufficient if the effect of the discriminatory prices "may be" to injure compe-
tition.25 It is highly questionable as to how the court in American was able
to reach the general conclusion that competition may not be lessened as
facts; and (3) competitive injury. Proof of all three is necessary to make out
a prima fade case.
General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 890 (1954).
15 Ibid.
H Supra note 13.
17 Samuel H. Moss Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734
(1945), modified, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946). The Moss doctrine is that once the
Commission proves there was a price discrimination, the burden shifts to the alleged
violator, to prove that the discrimination did not have the statutory effect on compe-
tition.
18 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
19 E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, supra note 8, at 154; Nat'l Lead Co v. FTC,
227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
25 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922).
21 Supra note 5.
22 Id. at 53.
23 General Food Corp., supra note 14, at 887.
24 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 4, at 841; Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v.
Diamond Block & Gravel Co., supra note 8, at 957; Standard Motor Prod., Inc. v. FTC,
supra note 8, at 676; Moog Indui, Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 51 (8th Cir. 1956), aftd,
355 U.S. 411 (1958); Nat'l Lead Co. v. FTC, supra note 19, at 835. Supra note 18,
at 792.
25 Supra note 5; Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
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to the future because of the temporary effects in the past. The court focused
exclusively on past effects which are inconclusive to a "probability" test,
and ignored the continuing 'CPA system.
Since the Act is not aimed at outlawing price discrimination per se it
is essential that a causal nexus between the price discrimination and the
injury to competition be shown in order to establish a section 2 (a) violation 2 0
In the past, in "secondary line" competition cases, it has been held that
proof of a substantial difference in prices to competing buyers was sufficient
to support the conclusion that competition with the favored customers may
be substantially injured by the discrimination. 27 The contention that such a
holding would be to the effect of adjudging price discriminations to be il-
legal per se has been rejected. 28
The Sun Oil case restated the FTC's interpretation of the "substan-
tially lessening competition" requirements in "secondary line" competition
when it held:
It seems self-evident that where a producer is selling a homogeneous
product, such as salt, automotive parts, or gasolines, where compe-
tition is extremely keen among retailers, and where margins of profit
or markup are small, a lower price to one or some of such competing
retailers not only "may" but must have the effect of substantially
lessening competition.2°
Yet the court in the instant case specifically rejects the contention that proof
of a substantial price differential between favored and unfavored purchasers
in a keenly competitive area, is sufficient to support the conclusion that such
a practice "may be" to substantially lessen competition. The court in the
instant decision attempts to distinguish Sun Oil on the basis that injury to
competition was not there disputed on appeal and therefore not in issue
before the Supreme Court. The court is for some reason undisturbed as to
why the issue was undisputed on a fact situation weaker than the one in
the instant case. Nevertheless, Sun also stated in reference to price dis-
criminations in favor of one dealer over the other:
We are not free on the basis of our own economic predelections to
make the choice between harm to McLean, on the one hand, and
to the other Sun operators, on the other, or to balance the com-
parative degree of individual injury in each instance; that choice
is foreclosed by the determination in the statute itself in favor of
equality of treatment. (Emphasis supplied.) 3°
Apparently the court in the instant case believes that such a proof re-
29 Supra note 18.
27 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, supra note 10, at 243-46; supra note 5; Corn Prod.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, supra note 25; Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
28 E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, supra note 8, at 154; Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC,
239 F.2d 253, 254-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1956); Moog Indus., Inc.
v. FTC, supra note 24, at 49.
29 Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 962 (1959).
89 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 371 U.S. 505, 519 (1963).
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quirement is essential to reconcile the Robinson-Patman Act with over-all
antitrust policies. 3 ' This is evidenced by the fact that the court places great
reliance on the classical language of the Anheuser-Busch decision, to the
effect that the Act is really referring to the effect upon competition and
not upon competitors. 32 However, it is submitted that Anheuser-Busch was
dealing with "primary line" competition, and that while Robinson-Patman
prohibits price discrimination which may substantially injure competition
in any line of commerce, important differences in practical orientation have
emerged. Price variations, challenged for their impact in seller-line cases,
are condemned only after a more forceful demonstration of enimical com-
petitive impact than might satisfy a charge of injurious effect on the customer
leve1.33 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Anheuser-Busch was careful
to point out that they were dealing with "primary line" competition and
that they did not also mean to depart from their holding in Morton Salt
as to adequacy of proof in "secondary line" competition cases. 34 Yet the
court in the instant case in disregard of this clear warning, as a practical
matter, has imposed the same requirement of proof laid down in Anheuser-
Busch with respect to primary line cases, to "secondary line" cases. As a
result, rather than reconciling Robinson-Patman with over-all antitrust
policies, the court in the instant case has perverted the basic philosophy
of the Act—to reach and prohibit discriminatory pricing in "secondary line"
competition which the Clayton Act did not provide for." Rather than
strengthen the Act, the court has weakened it in a manner clearly repugnant
to the reasons behind the passage of the Robinson-Patman as an amendment
to the Clayton Acta°
It is further questioned, as has been stated above, whether the standard
laid down by the court in the instant case is really feasible as a practical
matter to carry out the fundamental purposes of section 2 (a). The well
established test of reasonable probability of injury to competition, without
reference to a time factor as was done in the instant case, is consistent with
the design of the statute "to reach such discriminations in their incipiency
before the harm to competition is effected." 32 In light of American Oil, how
long must the Commission stand by and watch a substantial price differen-
tial between competing purchasers of a common supplier, before they can
act? The standard applied in American Oil, presents a new problem of where
to draw the line as to what is temporary and what is not. Such a holding
as in the instant case could open the door to a wholesale method of circum-
37 Supra note 10.
32 Supra note 4.
n Rowe, supra note 10, at 124 (substantially quoted).
34 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 11, at 552, n.21.
35 See supra note 2. The words in section 2(a): "or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination or with customers of either of them.. . ." are words added by
the Robinson-Patman Act to section 2 of the Clayton Act for the purposes of the
protection they afford to individual customers of the seller, and were entirely new to
our antitrust legislation.
36 Supra note II.
37 Corn Prod. Ref. Co v. FTC, supra note 25, at 738.
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venting the spirit and harmony of Robinson-Patman, by allowing the practice
of temporary price discrimination, the overall effect of which will cause that
potential danger of substantially lessening competition which the Act seeks
to prohibit. While it is true that the court in the scope of its appellate re-
view may upset the Commission's findings if they are not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole," the courts should scrupulously
avoid hamstringing the Commission in carrying out the basic purposes of the
Act, by imposing a greater degree of proof than has been necessary in the
past, as was done in the instant decision. Who is to know better than the
Commission which is staffed by experts in the area of economics and busi-
ness practices, what constitutes a substantial lessening of competition. "The
precise impact of a particular practice on trade is for the Commission, not
the courts to determine."39 It would be an understatement to say that the
decision in the instant case was a setback to the FTC and we can only watch
and wait to determine whether the standard laid down in the instant case
will be followed, or rejected by other circuits in subsequent decisions con-
cerning section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, so far as "secondary
line" competition is concerned.
CHARLES K. BERGIN, JR.
Labor Law—Section 301 —Employee's Standing to Enforce Contract
Rights Against His Union—Humphrey v. Moore.'—Respondent Moore
brought a class action in a Kentucky state court, on behalf of himself and
his fellow employees, against his union and his company (Dealers). He
prayed for an injunction to restrain the implementation of a joint grievance
committee's decision to dovetail the seniority lists of his company with those
of another company (E & L) which was moving from the area. The two
companies had arranged to transfer certain rights to each other, and the
question arose whether Dealers was absorbing . E & L's business within the
meaning of Dealers' collective bargaining contract, 2 which fact would per-
mit dovetailing. When the issue first arose, the president of the local union,
which represented the employees of both companies, informed Dealers'
employees that their jobs were not in jeopardy since there would be no ab-
sorption. But, when the union became More advised as to the nature of the
88 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
so FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). The Supreme Court
is apparently more favorably disposed to the expertise of the FTC. "We are persuaded
that the Commission's long and close examination of the questions it here decided has
provided it with precisely the experience that fits it for performance of its statutory
duty." FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).Inclu1 375 U.S. 335 (1964), rehearing denied, 32 U.S.L. Week 3297 (U.S. Feb 25, 1964).cl des companion suit General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No.s
89 v. Moore.
2 Article 4, Section 5 of the contract was as follows:
In the event that the Employer absorbs the business of another private, con-
tract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of lines, the seniority of
the employees absorbed or affected thereby shall be determined by mutual
agreement between the Employer and the Unions involved. Any controversy
with respect to such matter shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure.
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